A response to the higher probability of an infinite God existing; the reason for the existence of morals; and an argument against the adoption of Pascal's wager.

[This article addresses some comments made about Stephen Unwin's responses to Richard Dawkins' attack on Unwin's book The Probability of God, 2003]

On the matter of the existence of God as defined by standard monotheism, it is possible to assemble more arguments that point to the improbability of the existence of this particular type of God, than point to the probability of his existence [1].

As an example of one such counter argument to the existence of a god on the lines of St Anselm's "perfect being theology" [2], it is not difficult to show the inconsistencies entailed in any argument or belief that posits the existence of a necessary being that is also perfectly omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent and perfect in every sense it is possible to be. Perfect being theology (identifiable with the three monotheisms) posits such a god. Yet the following simple reductio ad absurdum easily demolishes such a claim:

1. God is an almighty necessary being
   
2. An almighty being can do anything
   
3. An almighty being would be able to cause itself to cease being necessary [from 2]
   
4. Ceasing to be necessary is impossible [definition of necessary being]
5. Therefore God is necessary but not almighty.

This reductio shows that if god exists as a necessary being then he cannot also be almighty, since it is beyond his power - and beyond the power of anything - to cause himself to cease being necessary. It is similar to the statement once made by AJ Ayer that even God (of perfect being theology) must respect the laws of logical necessity. Any being that must obey logical necessity cannot be Almighty, even if it could break the laws of a physically contingent reality (for e.g., a law of gravity or magnetism).

Moreover, a little thought also shows that even if god exists contingently he still cannot be almighty. If he were almighty in the sense of being able to do anything, then he would paradoxically be able to cause himself to become necessary. However, a necessary being cannot become necessary since it is always necessary. That is, there can be no time in which a necessary being ever was contingent, since if there ever had been such a time then that being could never be necessary.

From this it is clear that god cannot be almighty under any of the two possible existential conditions of either necessary being or contingent being. And since there are only two possible existential conditions for any being, there can never be a being that is almighty. Therefore, though we are not forced to accept a contingency to god's existence, we are forced to accept a limitation to his power. God, regardless of his existential nature, is not almighty.

There is an apparent get-out clause however. It may be claimed that being necessary does in itself entail almightiness, or that almightiness entails necessary being. A necessary being may be a necessary being because it has the eternal and infinite power to eternally will itself to be necessary. (And who wouldn't). However, what if it decided to stop willing itself to be necessary? But this would entail the same inconsistency exposed above, because if it is at any point in its existence necessary it must always be necessary, otherwise it could not have been necessary at all. Therefore, there is something that the necessary being cannot do – that is, decide to stop willing itself to be necessary. A necessary being therefore suffers from an additional limitation apart from a lack of almightiness in that it is evidently lacking in free will in an important way - it cannot commit suicide.

There may be yet a way round this dilemma by positing that God's necessity and will are one and the same: that necessary being is identical to the power to will one's self to exist eternally. Moreover, it might be argued that though a being capable of willing itself eternal existence could also will itself to cease being eternal, it never does so only because it wills itself to never want to become contingent.

Thus we have a possible definition of necessary being:

Necessary being is the manifestation of the will of an all-powerful being that wills itself to exist eternally because it wants to exist eternally.

Moreover, it wants to exist eternally because it wills itself to want this. It could will itself to cease being a necessary being (so believers in an all-mighty would have us believe), but to will this it must first will itself to want to cease being a necessary being; but, it may not want to. Nevertheless, given that the necessary being is almighty, it is potentially free to will whatever it wants, including willing wanting what it wants even though it may never activate that potential (because it doesn't want to.)

Types of non-almighty god might exist

However, even if the case for an almighty and necessary being appear to fail, as on first glance they do, it is possible to argue that some type of god exists and is responsible for the creation of this Universe at least. This follows from the fact that the possibility of a creator is not the same as the possibility of an infinitely powerful, infinitely perfect and infinitely good being as posited by traditional theology who is responsible for All That Exists (I use the Plantinga/Smith's definition of the God of Theology).

As arguments from philosophy and science show, it might be possible that a creator for our universe exists, in the form of a creator who creates a universe in the laboratory. Physicists Alun Guth and Andre Lindy's Inflationary Big Bang theory allows for this possibility and many scientists are of the opinion that it may be physically possible for us to do this one day.

Supposing that such a creator exists, he will then most probably be endowed with similar attributes as those of ours, such as rationality, morality and, one would hope, humour. He will also more than likely have an agenda, such as any scientist has an agenda, perhaps to discover some fundamental fact about his own universe by studying one created in the lab. It may then appear that it would be wise to divine the purpose of this creator so that we might “please” him, by helping to bring about the result he is looking for. However, though this thinking resembles the thinking of believers in an infinite God, it is not the same, since it posits a god who, nevertheless powerful, is still himself subject to the laws of nature, being a being who himself has arisen as a result of evolutionary processes in his universe. (Leaving aside the ultimate ontological question of how or why anything exists at all).

On this reasoning then, it would appear reasonable to adopt some form of Pascal's wager, in an attempt to assuage or please this creator. But it would not be the “sucking up” type of wager which Dawkins (rightly) ridicules, but a scientifically and philosophically informed wager. Does the creator know something about science? Yes, because if he created us in the lab then he knows about the laws of nature and how to manipulate them. If that is the case, then he is an advanced being, and to arrive at the status “advanced” he must have some appreciation of moral and ethical values at least as enlightened as the greatest liberal and humanist (or creaturist) thinkers of our Universe, some of whom maybe scientists (and some of whom may even be human). In which case he is unlikely to expect such facile and ridiculous observances as those demanded by the God of theology of the monotheistic religions, such as sexual denial, ceremony and pomp and even sacrifice, whether in the form of Abraham's or in the self indulgent and egoistical form of a believer denying himself some luxury or other during Ramadan, Lent and so on.

One point to note, however, is that the attribution of moral and ethical consciousness to the laboratory creator seems arbitrary, as indeed does the attribution of perfect goodness to the God of theology. But in fact in the case of a laboratory god it is not arbitrary, and answering the charge of its arbitrariness will also, as it happens, answer the question of why morals (and consciousness itself) exist for us.

Briefly, moral concepts that lead to cooperative modes of living provide a very efficient path for the development of advanced social systems that securely support reproduction than would otherwise be impossible if simple, brute competition was the only means of interaction.

It can be argued that a reason for semantic and phenomenal consciousness (that is, experience of meaning and feeling, such as qualia) arising and persisting through natural selection is that it is a very good way of advancing the survival of genetic material. Contrary to the claim that living systems even as complex as the human body can do just as well without conscious self awareness, as types of zombies, consciousness can be seen to be a synergistic addition to a much more limited low-level computational mode that does indeed only operate at the syntactical, non-qualia inducing level of a cognitive system such as a brain. The features of consciousness that are referred to as “qualia” are meaning-laden; whose ultimate manifestation is in a semantic that is moral and ethical. To know and understand the meaning and operation of moral and ethical concepts is to have access to modes of conduct that vastly enhance the survival possibilities of an organism endowed with such features. Any organism that constitutes a cognitive system capable of such a semantic computation will do better- in relative terms that are referred to its particular level of biological complexity (for, as Gould says, bacteria are the most successful organisms around) - than an organism that simply possess syntactical computational power.

The end result (i.e., co-operation) of the application of moral and ethical concepts by a complex organism capable of semantic, meaning-endowing cognition is, on the whole, greatly beneficial to the genes in possession of such a complex organism. Organisms that cooperate under the gaze of moral conceptualisations will do better than if they had never been impelled by this moral awareness (i.e. their consciences) to discover cooperation. They would forever remain in the vicious loop of brute competition for limited resources and never advance to stages in which they can find efficient, mutually beneficial modes of exploitation (provided it is not crunch time, when the mode reverts to brute competition.) Indeed, no path to society beyond that of ants and wolves is possible without the consolidating and lifting effect of cooperative behaviour driven by conscious awareness of moral concepts.

It can be fairly argued then, that both consciousness and moral awareness have a very good claim to being useful, if not utterly indispensable in the attainment of advanced social systems such as those of humans. (See Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea and Freedom Evolves for supporting arguments). That is not to say that the creation of complex social systems is the “aim” of evolution and that therefore morals and the co-operation to which they give rise are a deliberate intentional move to attain that goal. On the contrary, as with much else to do with evolution, they are discovered “smart moves” that arise and are preserved because they bring about a successful continuation and multiplication of those entities that foster them. (How they arise is answered by Dennett when he states that what is actual is a result of the discovery of possibilities in design space that can be actualised.)

Pascal's Wager

Pascal was mistaken in declaring that one had less to loose in believing than not. This follows from the fact that if one is to honestly believe in God, one must act on that belief, which usually entails following some sort of religious practice. That is not quite the beneficial thing as it is made out to be however. As can be seen from just observing the Religious, severe restrictions on normal life result from an unconditional, unquestioning belief in God, which is the usual demand of a god-centred religion. Observance can be costly, both in time and effort and in disruption to constructive activity.

The strangle hold that Islam has on the individual is currently the most obvious example of religion demanding costly action. With daily repetitions of observances, calls to prayer and the constant presence of religious imagery invasively permeating society, modern Islamic societies have stifled critical and hence creative thought. As a result (and sweeping with a broad brush), Islamic societies remain severely disadvantaged culturally and economically. Moreover, the direct daily effects of this strangle hold are seen in peoples' unnatural containment of sexual urges and in some cases the recent diversion of these to outlets in forms that detract from the moral elevation that religion is supposed to bring. For example, the internet has offered a channel for various forms of sexual “expression” among Muslims, mainly consisting of using the net for sexual content and for arranging sexual liaisons.

Moreover, in Islam, the demand for 5 prayers a day wastes many valuable man-hours, retarding development and impoverishing the people.

Perhaps it is a question of which religious system one adopts?

Not so. Christianity also directly impinges on normal and healthy expressions in its version of uncompromising stance on the institution of marriage; leading to guilt complexes should anyone sexually express themselves outside of marriage (not in the sense of being adulterous, but in the sense of choosing not to marry and still have sex).

I've given the most obvious examples of negative effects of religious belief, though one might argue that these are not enlightened religious belief. Nonetheless, it is clear that on the current model of monotheistic religious belief there is very much to lose from believing in a God, even if it is only to suffer the deleterious effects of sexual repression, never mind the rest of the inhibitions asked of a believer.

Furthermore, Pascal's wager cannot be softened by qualifying it with belief in an enlightened God who does not demand such extreme observances, since that would negate the necessity of the belief – which is to avoid the punishments prepared for lack of observance. There would be no point in the wager if the God believed in did not frown on such practices as sexual and cultural liberty.

It is then, on the above arguments, possible for a god to exist, and even to exist necessarily, but he cannot be an Almighty god who sits at the top of everything that exists. Moreover, if a he does exist, then he can only be a being who was originated in the same way that we were. And if he was originated in the same way that we were, then he will more than likely share our sense of justice and fairness as well as enlightened thought which leads to tolerance. He will be aware in other words, of the course of biological and cultural evolution as processes that pass through stages of intolerance as requisite for advance, but which intolerance is no longer necessary once better modes for advancement – i.e. cooperation driven by moral and ethical conscience – emerge.

As regards actual belief in a god of any type, the concept of god is a rational one, even though the actual decision to believe in god is irrational. That is rather, that the need and the process of conceptualising god is a rational need and process, but upgrading the resulting concept to a belief without verifiable evidence is utterly irrational. In other words, it is rational to search for explanations to reality, and the god hypothesis is a reasonable hypothesis in as far as it is a hypothesis and attempts to answer the ontological question. It only becomes unreasonable when elevated to status of truth, or alethea, in the absence of supporting, falsifiable, evidence.

[1] Though relative dominance in the number of coherent arguments supporting an hypothesis is certainly no proof of the veracity of that hypothesis, in the absence of irrefutable proofs that would show the veracity of the hypothesis, the number of coherent arguments can in fact be taken as a measure of its probable truth. Recently more and more scientists and philosophers are re-thinking Popper's falsifiability definitions of coherent argumentation and beginning to think more in terms of probabilistic definitions on the lines of Bayesian probability.

[2] According to Perfect Being Theology, we count a being as truly divine only if said being is maximally great.  That is to say, this being possesses the greatest array of compossible great-making properties.  The term “great-making properties” is generally used in the literature to signify those properties that it is intrinsically better to have than to not have.  Perhaps Anselm had something like this in mind when he said of God that He is whatever it is better to be than to not be. (Quoted from Summa Philosophiae)

See also St Anselm's Syndrome and Another Fool's Answer to St Anselm