The Parmenidean Challenge.
Risking cruel ridicule, posit your own hypothesis as to why something exists rather than nothing and win our covetable prize: a basket of salami, cheese and wine. More

An answer of one's own

The Parmenideum, as well as being a physical location, is also a concept that draws upon an ancient theme - that of the enquiry after knowledge. The name chosen for this concept derives of course from that of Parmenides, the first philosopher to clearly and systematically set down an argument concerning the fact of Being.

As Nestor Cordero of the University of Rennes has recently written in his book on the poem of Parmenides (By Being, It Is, 2006): "Parmenides is the first philosopher who argues, who gives reasons in support of his thesis".

This is in contrast to his predecessors, among them Thales and Anaximander (worthy fellows nonetheless), who more or less offered explanations of reality without apparently seeking to properly justify those explanations. Though their pronouncements (mostly wrong) were nonetheless the fruits of systematic thought, unlike Parmenides they neither apparently laboured nor enjoined others to actually reason for themselves in order to find whatever justifications are necessary for accepting an hypothesis. Perhaps they didn't do that, because even they didn't quite believe their answers!

In contrast, Parmenides, as Nestor Cordero states, wished for others to see for themselves, to ask, test and conclude, which is none other than philosophy guided by science, no less. Only relatively few other philosophers since Parmenides - Aristotle, Karl Popper and Daniel C. Dennett being three that come to mind - have actually taken seriously and consistently the importance of science to philosophy. One can do science without philosophy, as many scientists prove daily; but philosophy without science runs the risk of sometimes being lame.

Plato might be an example of the lameness of a philosophy that doesn't apply good science. (Aristotle also got much of his "systematic thinking" wrong, though he did get some things right. When he did on occasion get things right it was probably because of good science, proving that systematic thought isn't enough - you need to test it. Moreover, to his credit, Aristotle actually tried to use science, whereas Plato simply tried to apply reason, which has a terrible tendency to wobble without the support of evidence).

Moreover, though the actual physical nature of Being must have surely interested Parmenides intensely (which, recall, was the major pre-occupation of his Milesian predecessors, Thales et al), he is best known for positing an argument that addresses the question of why and how there is a being in the first place. More or less, why is there something rather than nothing? Who or what decreed it, how did it come about and what sustains it? In other words, "What's the reason why something exists and how can it continue to exist once it does actually exist?"

We might wish to dispute the apparently coherent proposition that the "natural" state of reality is that "nothingness" should obtain, and that the fact of something existing actually needs an explanation. It seems natural to us, accustomed to causal explanations for things occurring, to assume that Being must have been caused by "some thing", and that before this cause there was actually "nothing". This is in fact the assumption that is taken to task in Parmenides' thesis, set out in his poem On Nature, that it is impossible that there is any time in which no thing exists.

Needless to say many have argued that Parmenides did not give a definitive answer (most notable among them Aristotle and his mentor Plato), but his enquiry still remains valuable nonetheless, even if one were to take that view. It must surely rank among the greatest exemplars of the search for knowledge, for what greater a knowledge could there be than the answer as to why anything exists at all, including ourselves?

Perhaps, however, greater than the answer is actually positing the question in the first place; and then having the temerity to not only ignore the official explanatory hypotheses of the day (the gods did it!), but to co-opt them into a scientific thesis. That is to say that though Parmenides, as Cordero points out, draws heavily on the myth-language of the time, his intention is not mystical. His use of mythic imagery is simply as an aid in appealing to the general reader, or more likely listener, who would have better understood such language.

Parmenides sets about constructing an answer based on a rationalistic approach to the fact of being: something exists, that is undeniable. But it must have existed always, unchangingly, because otherwise it must have had a beginning, which would beg the question, what "started" that beginning? And so on.

In other words Parmenides had a strong aversion to infinite regresses, which would have ruled out the possibility of gods as a first cause, since if one extends the question to the gods one is forced into yet another infinite regress. His reason therefore told him that, though it was a pretty tough cookie to bite, nevertheless everything had existed always and done so unchangingly (which also led him to deny that all change percept able to the senses was an illusion).

In a way perhaps, Parmenides' thesis is very much an obvious one. However, no one had stumbled upon it until Parmenides, probably because of its quasi nihilistic implications as well as peoples' desire not just for certainties, but for comforting certainties. It was this that both Plato, and especially his master Socrates, could not abide. So simple a thesis, yet with such profound psychological implications about our place in the cosmos, it had to be refuted. After all, if nothing ever happens, and nothing changes, what use are goodness, truth and beauty, even if they themselves are unchanging?

But even if we deny Parmenides' answer the honour of being the greatest answer possible, it must surely be one of the most important and worthy of proper consideration, since in the wrong hands we risk receiving all manner of questionable answers, as religion has admirably demonstrated.

As mentioned, the knowledge that was sought by Parmenides regarding the nature of being does not address the question of what is the "substance" of existence (the Milesian School), but rather why and how it is that anything exists at all. We might like to rephrase his enquiry and ask what are the physical processes that allow a universe to come into existence (though according to Parmenides it exists eternally) and why do those processes themselves exist?

A novelty for his era, his enquiry not only (implicitly) addressed the question of the causal mechanisms that might lead to creation or sustain the eternal existence of matter, but principally it can be seen to address the reason why there should be a mechanism or processes that leads to the appearance of something. Equally and in the same vain, if existence is deemed to be eternal and therefore to have no beginning or end as Parmenides actually concluded, the question becomes "Given something exists, why (and how) should it exist eternally?" And so on.)

Some might answer this dilemma by saying that if you discover and explain the mechanism by which an entire Universe (or Multiverse) can appear from apparently nothing (or if something from nothing bothers you as it did Parmenides, then how something can exist always) then you have also explained the reason why anything exists.

Cosmologists such as Stephen Hawking, Paul Steinhardt, Alexander Vilenkin and others believe that the universe is in fact uncaused, or at the very most it does not have an external cause but causes itself to exist. Hawking has commented that perhaps a theory of everything (TEO) can be found that could be expressed by an equation or set of equations that are so compelling as to have caused themselves to become a reality. And philosopher Quinten Smith argues that the Universe can cause itself to exist in a variety of ways, one being the outlandish suggestion by physicist Alan Guth that time travelers could have traveled back in time and caused matter compressed to a singularity to explode, as a result causing the Big Bang.

However, do these and other hypotheses answer the question of why the universe should exist as opposed to how, in the mechanical sense, it came to be? Taking Guth's suggestion and accepting for a moment that it is possible, one answer would be that the time travelers who caused the compressed matter to explode wanted the universe to exist - however bizarre such a desire seems, in view of the fact that they would not have had that desire if the universe had not first existed. Moreover, seeing that it already existed, why go to all the bother of causing it to exist?

Considering Hawking's idea of the compelling nature of an equation that encapsulates a TEO, we similarly find a difficulty in attributing a reason as to why the Universe exists, unless we simply say "because the equation is so compelling". However, we could be tiresome and ask further why questions, such as; a) why is the equation so compelling?; and b) why does the equation itself exist in the first place?

Presumably the first tiresome question will be answered once we have the equation, for it will be possible to analyze and test it and come up with a reason for its compulsive behaviour. But the second question still apparently poses a problem since it refers to not just a cause of the equation and its compelling nature but why there should be an equation that causes itself to become reality and not, say, an equation that prevents itself from becoming a reality. This follows from the simple fact that we can equally imagine that the "state of affairs of reality" might have been totally different and the only thing that might have had "expression" was an equation that negates anything beginning to exist. Although this last appears to be a paradox, since an equation that negates existence cannot itself exist if its realisation is that nothing should exist, which must include itself.

It's worth noting that bizarreness and apparent absurdity are not necessarily precluded from this particular search for an unshakeable epistemological grounding for ultimate ontological truths. Perhaps the more bizarre (though coherently argued nevertheless) it sounds the more confident we can be that we are on the right track. Which is what philosopher Robert Nozick states (Philosophical Explanation): "The question cuts so deep...that any approach that stands a chance of yielding an answer will look extremely weird. Someone who proposes a non-strange answer shows he didn't understand the question" [Quote taken from Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Page 180, footnote]

So, why the Parmenideum?
One has to reluctantly leave such apparently idle, though seductive thoughts alone for most of one's waking life, since they hardly put bread on the table or fend off wild animals, unless you are a professional philosopher. Or unless you want to be a winner of the Parmenideum Challenge. Not only that, questions like these will quickly loose you friends and influence absolutely no one worth influencing if you are unable to contain yourself and casually drop them into the day-to-day moments of life, as at the coffee machine or at the bus stop.

However, this is where perhaps the Parmenideum can make a small difference, by at least providing a place rather much nicer than the bus stop and considerably less risky, where one can discuss, posit, adumbrate, pontificate and perhaps even argue passionately about any philosophical point, however obscure, without the fear of being labeled or discouraged by the indolent and criminal laziness of others (Flogging with birches should be brought back for indolence).

The Parmenideum has as its central reason to be this sharing - with like minded people - of the "enquiry" into true and interesting knowledge.

This is not exclusively limited to the question of being however, but includes (and must include) virtually the whole field of philosophy as well as science; and, in some instances, that of theology, if only to refute it and show its hidden lack of real worth as a system of "knowledge" for understanding and explaining the world, regardless of what anyone might claim about it's ability to provide comfort and meaning to life.

People who search for proper knowledge (that is, evidence based truth) will have realised that the search is best conducted in a spirit of community, one which is formed by all those interested in the fundamental questions of existence as well as the implications the results of an inquiry into these will have for our lives. What is existence made of, why do we exist, how should we live our lives? - these are all critical questions but so far, ironically, only irrational, non-empirical systems of thought have enjoyed universal access when it comes to positing the answers, even though rational, empirical systems have had much greater success in actually explaining the world.

According to religion - the arch non-rational, non empirical system - there is a pre-ordained purpose to our existence, in which case we had better pay good attention to who ever it is that decreed that purpose (God, of course).

But according to science, there is no fixed purpose, in which case we had better pay attention to the things that will best help us to survive an uncaring, mindless, purposeless universe - things such as co-operation in exploiting resources, agreements in limiting the demands on those resources, care for the environment, empathy for each other and so on.

In fact, these - science and religion - are the only two answers possible to the conundrums of existence and life. Which nonetheless still leaves us with the problem of who or what is the arbitrator that decides which one is true, or more likely to be true? It can only, of course, be reason which is, more or less, philosophy by another name.

With regard to religion, it simply rests on it's own authority, which it claims to have by virtue of the supernatural. It also posits absolute answers to all questions of existence and of moral and ethical life on the basis of that authority. As for science, it draws it's authority from the natural, which is accessible and open to testing. It does not, however, offer absolute answers to everything; is neutral on questions of morality unless it can provide a good reason; and, with regard to the reason why anything exists at all, it is so far justly silent (though there are one or two noises from people such as Hawkins and Guth as we have seen above).

We are left high and dry, apparently, by both these systems. On the one hand Religion offers grand answers that, though it claims are absolute and immutable, are in fact nothing of the sort and are insupportable and vulnerable at anytime to impertinent challengers - something which the Catholic Church will no doubt attest to. Neither progress nor equity can be served by such a system.

On the other hand, Science, though certain to a degree sufficient to allow us to be masters of the universe - building planes, rockets, computers that control economies, communications that have transformed history and so on - nevertheless usually draws a blank when it comes to how we should apply its triumphs and conduct our lives.

Philosophy then, may be one way to resolve this dilemma.

With the above in mind, it is our hope that the various talks, seminars, debates and open discussion sessions (often with delicious snacks and refreshments) at the Parmenideum will not only provide a forum for exchanging ideas about why we are and what to do about it, but also for stimulating and promoting another core objective of Parmenides' own efforts: that of critical thinking.

Nothing should be accepted on face value except perhaps the very fact of existence itself. Second to this fact however, all things are rightly questioned and those which purport to be true must stand the test of a "free and public examination" to borrow a phrase from Kant. Only in this way can we be sure that what we hold as true and worthy of belief is not simply true but also useful. More importantly, it is the only way in which we can be sure that what others tell us is true is, in fact, true, and that being so it is less likely to be used as the instrument of others' desires and more likely will be used in the service of the good of all - whatever that turns out to be.

The two examples of such apparent truths, as already mentioned, are the opposing claims of religion and science. Both cannot be true, but how may it be established the truth of one or the other so as to be sure that we have not made a mistake in judgment (are we absolutely sure about what science can tell us when it can't even (yet) respond properly to Parmenides?) Moreover, if one purports to offer a truth that the other cannot answer, as religion does with respect to science on the question of Being, we are duty bound to put it to the test and ask by what method this truth is arrived at. But at least science draws a clear line between explaining how the universe works and why it is there in the first place. Whereas religion, on the other hand, doesn't bother with the piffling problem of explaining how the universe works (beyond saying that god operates, or sustains, it) and jumps straight in and claims that God said "let there be...".

By conducting an inquiry such as this in the gorgeous surroundings of The Cilento (with lunch or dinner never far away) we are certainly not guaranteed to arrive at a truth, and probably will raise more problems than we can solve. But what we are guaranteed is a method by which to judge the reasonableness of a claimed truth and thereby judge of its worthiness of being held in such esteem -as a very probable truth. Or at the very least a worthy candidate for a probable truth.

And from that follows the worth that we might derive from this (possibly "probationary") truth, as when for example science can offer a proper account of the motion of the planets and religion cannot. No one has actually observed the planets orbit the sun - or at least only a very few astronauts have, and even then they may not have been able to discern the orbits. But the reasonableness of the claim by science and the power of the claim to produce results - successful missions to the planets for example - lead us to accept the truth of the claim (But do we accept that probes have visited the planets, and why do we accept that "truth"?). The "truths" of science in this regard certainly seem worthy of esteem and further, seem worthy of use in the real world. Without wishing to sound circular or even facetious, the truths of science are probably worthy for use in the world because - they are useful. (Note: the planets in fact all travel along straight paths in four dimensions. So where is the truth? Is it found through our apparent perspective of 3 dimensions or the perspective of 4?)

The Parmenideum then, is formed around this form of inquiring, with the additional objective of bringing together people who hold an interest in engaging in this enquiry. As regards this latter objective there is a great and important emphasis on enjoyment, for without enjoyment such an enquiry threatens to become the dry, austere and brittle monolith of religion, or the necessarily rigid methodology of science. Instead, we aim for the alta visione of science and the agile thought of philosophy, together with a flourish from the kitchen.

To sum up the concept of the Parmenideum, it would be fair to say that it is a forum for reasoned debate concerning the nature of reality and truth, seasoned with enjoyment. Why not, there are worse ways to pass the time.

As a bonus, we might even discover a few reasonable proto-answers. Who knows.

Of interest and further reading

• Parmenides' poem On Nature at Parmenides.com
• Nestor Cordero, By Being It Is: The Thesis of Parmenides
• Bede Rundle, Why does something Exist rather than Nothing?, OUP 2004 (Read a review by philosopher Stephen Law)
• Alan Guth, The Inflationary Universe, Perseus Books, 1997. (Read York University review)
• Quinten Smith, Personal web page with many online papers
• Paul Davis author of The Goldilocks Enigma and The Self made Universe
• Robin Le Poidevin, Travels in Four Dimensions, OUP, 2003 (Google Books preview)